Korean Reunification: An Autarchic or Egalitarian Consociational Approach?

from 2009

North and South Korea share a parcel of

land approximately the size of Great

Britain. Japan had occupied Korea
until the conclusion of WWII. Japan, defeated, lost

influence in the region to the Soviet Union

while the United States became a factor in

the new Korea that split along ideological

lines. Communism reigned in the north

with the Soviet Union/North Korea

opposing the United States/South Korea in

the south. A heavily militarised

demarcation line to prevent the recurrence

of war separates the two countries. The

North Korean regime has become a pariah

in the international community because of

its constant threats of nuclear proliferation

often aimed at its neighbours.

North Korea has become a quasar of sorts

in the region, utilising the six-party talks to

gain concessions for food and medicine.

There are parallels that this paper will

consider, for example, the eventual

unification of East and West Germany after

the fall of Communism in Europe. In

particular, the Korean peninsula is far

more problematic to speculate if

unification is achievable, with China and

Vietnam sporting growing economies in

the region while spouting Marxist

hyperbole. This paper asks: Can the sixparty

talks produce a peaceful resolution

to the Korean conflict and what other

options are available? North Korea’s

undertaking as a ”rent – seeking” economy

threatens to dismantle the “six-plus” talks.

Charles Wolf and Kamil Akramov state that

despite North Korea’s imperiled economy,

it still ranks in the top dozen conventional

armies, thus dampening prospects for reunification.

History and Teleology

“The foundation –stone of this work

(internationalism) is and must be the state.

Respect for its fundamental sovereignty

and integrity are crucial to any common

international progress. The time of

absolute and exclusive sovereignty,

however, has passed; its theory was never

matched in reality.”[2]

This comment from former UN chief,

Boutros Boutros – Ghali, collided with the

idealistic nature that is the scope of the UN

since its inception. His unwillingness to

heed to convention led to his eventual

departure after one term as UN Secretary

– General. The notion of collective security

had been threatened by Ghali’s “realist”

approach to international relations. The

Korean conflict is a product of Cold War

adversaries that ultimately exploited the

Korean Peninsula to wage a proxy war that

remains, despite the diminished presence

of Marxism on a global scale.

The Korean Peninsula transformed

ideologically in 1948. At the close of WWII,

the UN had sought plans for a United

States/ Soviet Union stewardship after the

defeat of Japan during WWII. Japan had

been a suzerain over Korea since 1905

through the signing of the ‘Japan – Korea

Annexation Treaty.’ The U.N.’s plan,

however, did not manifest and Korea was

separated at the 38 parallel in 1948 that

placed the north in Communist control and

the south into an autocracy.[3]The status

quo remains to this day although the south

has undergone a period of

democratisation since the 1980’s with

tremendous economic growth resulting in

current GDP at 969.8 billion US, according

to World Bank estimates.[4]North Korea

was under the leadership of Kim Il Sung

since its inception. Kim had strong roots in

communism as a young man that manifest

during his school years in Manchuria,

where his family had emigrated. He

returned to Korea after his release from

prison in China for his involvement in the

South Manchurian Communist Youth

League. Japanese presence in Korea had

stoked his interest in attacks against the

Japanese. With a large insurrection of

Japanese into Korea during WWII, Kim fled

to the Soviet Union. Thus, when the UN

talks broke down over stewardship of

Korea, the Soviets handpicked Kim to head

the new state of North Korea and with it,

the dawning of the Kim Dynasty. Though

Kim died in 1994, control was passed to his

son, Kim Jong-Il that remains today.

Perhaps innocuously, Kim Jong-Il has not

succeeded his father as President of Korea,

leaving Kim IL Sung, the only deceased

head of state.[5]

Confucianism was the prototype of the

essence of the familial nature of the Kim

Dynasty. Recently, Kim Jong-Il was

diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, which

will bring into question his successor,

rumoured to be his youngest son, and

whether he will carry on the Confucian

doctrine and communist ideology.

Currently, just as Kim IL Sung managed as

leader, Korea remains a rent-seeking

nation. However, the cost of propping up a

country that is archaic and provocative in

international affairs remains dubious. The

cost of maintaining the status quo on the

Korean Peninsula must be measured

against the price of reunification that

includes the mass exodus of North

Koreans into neighbouring states, and the

large influx of monetary funds to expand

North Korea’s GDP to be competitive with

the South Korea’s.

Can the German Model Be Copied?

In the aftermath of the Asian financial

crisis, German economist, Heiner

Flessbeck, stated that South Korea, with

the possibility of re-unification at that time,

could not muster the financial burden that

the assimilation from the North would

bring the country, as a whole. He cites that

West Germany, prior to re-unification, was

one of the leading economies on a global

level.[6]However, since the time of his

paper, South Korea’s economy has rallied

from the “Asian Flu” to post modest GDP in

recent years, until the current economic

downturn. Indeed, the cost of reunification

to the new German state was

approximately 5% to 6% of West

Germany’s GDP or $1.4 trillion, between

1991-2004.[7] In addition, East Germany’s

population was one quarter of West

Germany’s; North Korea’s population is

half of South Korea. Compared with East

Germany’s military, North Korea’s military

obligation is higher. The former Soviet

Union (FSU) managed a client- patron

relationship with East Germany that

covered the majority of military

expenditures. The collapse of the Soviet

empire spelled the end of Russian aid to

North Korea. Korean geography constrains

the movement of people from the north to

the south unlike the easier access to West

Germany that enabled East Germans to

transfer across the border creating a crisis.

If the goal of doubling the GDP in North

Korea in the short term is reachable and

sustainable this can be a significant factor

in stemming the tide of refugees into the

north and into the south and the ROK.

The value of wages in North Korea will be

worth less in the South because of the

lower productivity levels. Here, the value of

East German wages was approximately 1/3

of West Germany, according to Wolf and

Akramov. Moreover, the nature of the

Marxist structure does not lend itself to

competition in labor, as was seen with

“state farms” in the Soviet Union that

reinforces the strength of democratisation,

that would benefit a united Korea.

Both Koreas and Germany’s share (d) the

same culture, language and a lengthy

political estrangement of the two parts,

while North Korea and East Germany were

part of a planned economy as compared to

South Korea and West Germany whose

economy is market-based.

In addition, Wolf and Akrimov indicate that

“contact, communication, and trade” was

larger in scope than that of the Korea’s at

the present time. Moreover, they stress

that Korean re-unification should avoid the

German macroeconomic model such as

the equalisation of currencies, wages,

pensions and other worker privileges. In

particular, the political pressure felt by

former Chancellor Helmet Kohl led to

these equalisation measures. The

leadership of South Korea should feel no

such pressure with the single-minded

approach of the North’s propensity for

nuclear propagation and threats towards

its neighbour’s in the region, as well as the

geography which limits the rush to the

South by civilians, should reunification

occur.[8]Moreover, with the North Korean

leadership shielding the population from

the lifestyle of South Koreans, the desire to

emigrate will be tempered, unlike the East

Germans who were exposed to the high

living standards of the West with better

access to media, gifts from the Diaspora in

West Germany, and freedom of

movement. The “Basic Treaty” between

East and West Germany signed on

December 21, 1972 improved bilateral

relations that saw trade double between

1970-1985 with travel increasing for both

sides. Indeed, compared with the hard

limitations of North Korean’s on

movement of its civilians, East Germany

allowed 30,000 people to emigrate to West

Germany in 1984 and 20,000 in 1986.

[9]Due to the demarcation zone separating

both Koreas, defectors enter China to go

around the North into South Korea. Both

North Korean’s and former East German’s

shared the distinction of feeling as secondclass

citizens in their adopted homeland.

[10]

In sum, Wolf and Akramov claim the cost

of doubling the GDP of the North could

range anywhere from $50 billion to 670

billion in 2003 U.S. dollars. Even if North

Korea continues as an independent state

and democratizes, the presence of poor

weather, a “MIC” military industrial

complex that sucks the wealth from its

citizens, and a regime that isolates itself

from the global community, North Korea

will continue down the path of

repressiveness until it completely fails as a

state. Indeed, Foreign Policy magasine lists

North Korea at 17 on its current list of

failed states.[11]The presence of the “Six

Party Talks” holds hope for a multi-lateral

solution in concert with the current UN

sanctions that threaten the Kim regime’s

basis for economic survival and the

continuation of a “rent-seeking”

philosophy. The “Dear Leader’s” health in

jeopardy leaves open the question and

justification of the continuation of

repressive policies.

Solutions

“All forms of political organisation have a

bias in favour of the exploitation of some

kinds of conflict and the suppression of

others because organization is the

mobilization of bias. Issues are organized

into politics while others are organized

out.”[12]

Schattschneider ‘s quote is paramount to

the Marxist doctrine that illustrates North

Korea as typically characteristic of Marxist

regimes, but also applies to their southern

cousins who capitalize on labour in a

capitalist society. One can say that South

Korea is notoriously bad because they buy

cheap labour from the North to operate

factories in the Kaesong industrial

complex, a joint venture between both

sides.

The number of solutions to aid in

reunification is nominal. I feel there are

two areas that encompass this:

“egalitarian” and “autarchic.”

Egalitarian

Currently, North Korea is not pursuing

membership in the ASEAN group while

South Korea has membership along with

Japan and China. South Korea is a member

of the W.T.O. while North Korea is not. The

DOHA round of trade talks is based on the

premise of reducing tariffs around the

world, and is a component of the W.T.O.

The nexus of this solution involves

reaching out to North Korea that would

bring them into the W.T.O. and ASEAN,

however, as part of a unified Korea. At a

recent WTO conference in Seoul, Director-

General of the WTO – Pascal Lamy touted

South Korea’s success as the 11 largest

exporter and 13 largest importer, both on

a global scale. The principle reason for

South Korea’s growth since its inception

lies in its export of automobiles, ships, and

steel. DG Lamy explains further that South

Korea has the cornerstones in place to

accelerate growth such as a “highly

educated, productive and innovative

workforce and proper government

policies.”[13]A consociational approach

would bring credibility to talks that puts

the onus on North Korea to accept terms

that are fair, and that benefit all parties,

citizens, and the global community. In

order to achieve a greater chance of

success, it will be necessary to co-opt

elements of the Kim regime in order to

give them a voice in the operation of an

expanded Korean state; whether these

elements stick is difficult to determine,

however, they will present a ballast for a

smoother transition. The vehicle to provide

impetus still remains the six-plus party

talks, however, an expanded format to

include other nations such as Canada with

its history as a peacekeeping nation, and

India can offer a model for the North

Koreans to follow under democratisation.

Moreover, I feel it will take one leader to

demonstrate the need to find common

ground for the peace process to manifest.

Perhaps an unknown figure may bring new

ideas and energy to the process, or a

charismatic leader such as President

Obama can sway both sides. Sheila Smith

from The Council on Foreign Relations

believes that the “regional partnership

between the United States and the

countries of Northeast Asia remains the

best vehicle for building stable

relationships on and around the Korean

peninsula.”[14]

Autarchic

The six-plus talks began in earnest in 2003

with the objective of halting the nuclear

program of North Korea. Despite North

Korea’s agreement to abandon its nuclear

goals in 2005, it maintains the ideal of

“rent-seeking” in order to extort necessary

goods from the U.S. and the ROK (Republic

of Korea), in particular. Originally, in 1994

the U.S. and DPRK (Democratic Peoples

Republic of Korea) agreed to the cessation

of plutonium enrichment on the Korean

peninsula in exchange for American aid in

developing “light-water” reactors that

would produce electricity. North Korea

insisted upon bi-lateral talks and stable

relations with the U.S. The U.S. wanted

guarantees that the DPRK was complying

with weapons inspectors as part of the

NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty).

However, the U.S. would not agree to the

North’s demands, while tensions mounted

that led to the start of expanded talks with

China and eventually Japan, Russia, and

South Korea, thus, the foundation of the

“Six-Party Talks.”[15]The essence of the

agreement for Washington is to make

North Korea’s nuclear weapons an

international issue that cannot be

addressed through bi-lateral talks with the

U.S. North Korea wants a non-aggression

pact with the U.S. based on the 25,000 plus

U.S. troops in South Korea, and normal

relations with America. South Korea has

invoked the “Sunshine Policy” to dissuade

an abrupt incursion of refugees from the

North through offers of aid. China has

used the DPRK as a proxy to gain more

influence with the U.S. and to influence the

DPRK to the bargaining table. In fact, China

is the DPRK’s primary trade partner, while

being cognisant about a large influx of

refugees from the North. Russian presence

allows for more influence in Southeast Asia

and helps to allay its fears of refugees into

its borders. Japan has security issues with

the DPRK launching missiles that can reach

its population.[16]The Six-Party Parks have

failed to produce the goal of

denuclearization to the extent of

Washington’s satisfaction. In addition,

North Korea has deliberately flouted the

terms of the agreement to receive aid from

the U.S. and others. On June 12, 2009 the

U.N. imposed sanctions on the DPRK

because intelligence indicated that North

Korea was selling nuclear weapons and/or

WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) to

rogue nations or groups. Article 41 does

not allow for the use of armed force to

circumvent the passage of ships suspected

of carrying illicit weapons. Moreover, North

Korea’s Foreign Minister condemned the

sanctions and stated that the DPRK will

“turn the remaining volume of newly

enriched plutonium into weapons”

including “launch efforts to enrich

uranium” which is the acknowledgement

by the Kim government that it has been

active in advancing its nuclear program.

[17]

The solutions for managing the nuclear

crisis take precedence but lead, in a “backhanded”

way to the issue of reunification

on the Korean peninsula. The latest

sanctions offer measured pressure on the

DPRK to facilitate the reduction in nuclear

activity. They do not punish them for

launching missiles, however. Failure of

sanctions leaves the option of a military

strike on Pyongyang’s reactors or facilities.

While this would create tension in the

region and place China in an awkward

position of arbiter, pressure from Beijing

may force the Kim regime back to the table

for talks. In the event of an economic

“meltdown” inside North Korea and/or the

DPRK’s insolence towards its neighbour’s,

the P5 of the UN could propose installing a

provisional government in North Korea,

effectively a democratic coup d’état. This is,

of course a provocation of war and places

the burden squarely on Washington to

react to any act of aggression towards the

Kim government. The U.S. knows too well

about the high cost associated with

managing rogue regimes, particularly, the

“no-fly” zones in Iraq. Could it be a

plausible solution to an ever-belligerent

foe in North Korea? A provisional

government with a consociational

approach may help placate the anguish

and loss of pride of the upper echelon in

the Kim government. This can be

accomplished by power-sharing in three

key areas of government: shared Secretary

of States as the role of President would

have to be dissolved, second-Foreign

Affairs, and Defense with the coalition of

UN governors’ having final authority.

An alternative measure that may affect

prospects for reunification, involve

imposing an embargo on the purchase and

sale of all North Korean goods. This will be

difficult with China as the principal trading

partner of the DPRK, notwithstanding, the

outcry from humanitarian groups that cite

the conditions in the impoverished state.

The international community and the U.S.

can refer to the decades long embargo on

Cuba to indicate their ability to manage

against the burden of an embargo. Human

rights groups can counter that the Cuban

embargo has produced little effect on the

Castro regime and has placed greater

hardship on Cuban citizens.

Finally, the UN could threaten sanctions on

Korean trading partners that are known

purchasers of illicit weapons (WMD). The

United States may insist on controlling the

flow of food and medicine into North

Korea along with the aid of a consortium of

states, such as members in the “six-plus”

talks along with peace-making/keeping

nations such as Canada and India. The

outcome looks extremely problematic for a

peaceful solution to the North Korean

people who are suppressed by the Stalinist

tendencies of the Kim Dynasty. Despite all

of the rhetoric, it seems clear that North

Korea’s neighbours seem fearful of an

exodus of North Korean’s into their

territory. The comparison from the

German reunification is that German

borders were far softer than North Korea

with its geography and heavily militarised

zone separating the long-time adversaries.

Given a power-sharing arrangement either

in an egalitarian or autarchic manner, the

net result should be the freeing of the

citizens of North Korea from the chains of

a despotic ruler who appears to have seen

better days.

Conclusion

To utilise Churchill’s analogy regarding

Korea “ A riddle wrapped in a mystery

inside an enigma.” Wolf and Akramov state

that the unification of the two Koreas with

the South being an OECD member on the

strength of a per capita income exceeding

$10,000, while the North has an

impoverished population and an economy

that relies on the sale of nuclear weapons,

counterfeit currency, and illicit narcoticsmake

it the riddle, how to connect

economic costs with a complex

reunification is the mystery, while North

Korea’s “dear leader” is the enigma.

Churchill was directing his quote to the

Soviet Union, the Marxist state that elicited

the same economic and social problems as

North Korea. However, it is the diminutive

size of the DPRK and its population, and

proximity to neighbouring states that

create periods of angst due to its cache of

nuclear weapons and unpredictable

behavior. Regardless of China’s vigor and

economic wherewithal, and the strength of

the E.U., the U.S. remains at the top of a

unipolar universe, making the process of

reunification a multi-lateral effort through

the “Six-Party Talks.”

The German model will be economically

unfeasible for Korea because of population

variances.

A consociational approach may be most

effective in the transition from a two state

system into a reunified single state

democracy. This will require the leadership

of the North Korean’s to cede power to

their brethren in the south or through a

complex power-sharing arrangement with

UN members. Given the acrimonious

relationship of the two countries since the

end of WWII, the presence of an expanded,

multi-lateral approach beyond the six-plus

talks seems like a viable egalitarian

method. An autarchic strategy with UN

sanctions and possible military strike may

be necessary to stop North Korean

brinkmanship regarding the “Six-Plus” talks

that have fostered Korea’s modus

operandi as a “rent-seeking” nation for

over fifty years.

Consociationalism defined:

"Consociation is a well-established and potentially democratic, liberal and fair means of achieving self-determination for communities in deeply pluralist or deeply divided places. It is especially appropriate where the residential mixing of populations make outright sovereign independence for each community in their own nation-state - or territorial autonomy for each community in their own regional state - difficult to accomplish, let alone justify." 

http://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/14

Works Cited

[1]Wolf Jr., Charles, and Kamil Akramov.

North Korean Paradoxes, Circumstances,

Costs, and Consequences of Korean

Unification. Santa Monica: Rand, 2005.

[2]Ghali, Boutros-Boutros. ”An Agenda for

Peace, 2 edition. (New York: United

Nations Publications, 1995) 237 in Larry

Fisk & John Schellenberg. Patterns of

Conflict, Paths To Peace Peterborough:

Broadview Press, p.79.

[3]Wikipedia. 13 July 2009. 14 July 2009.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kor

ea.>

[4]Web.worldbank.org. 2009. 14 July 2009

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER

NAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:2053

5285~menuPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150

~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html

>.

5]http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/C

OLDsung.htm Wikipedia. 13 July 2009. 14 July 2009.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Korea.

[6]Flassbeck, Heiner. Exit and Voice – The

Political Economy of Wages and

Unemployment in a Unified Country – The

German Case-. Paper presented at a

conference on Korea’s possible Unification

by the East/West Center of Hawaii

University in Honolulu. August 1998. 37,38.

<http://www.flassbeck.de/Deutsch/Publika

tionen/Aufsaetze1999-2005.html>.

[7]Wolf Jr., Charles, and Kamil Akramov.

North Korean Paradoxes, Circumstances,

Costs, and Consequences of Korean

Unification. Santa Monica: Rand, 2005,

P.28. The author does not quote the

reunification costs in U.S. currency or

Deutsche Marks. The assumption is that

with the referral to “German wealth” it is in

Marks.

[8]Wolf Jr., Charles, and Kamil Akramov. P.

52-53.

[9]East Germany-A Country Study.Federal

Research Division Of The Library Of

Congress. July 1987. 19 July 2009. <

http://www.country-data.com/cgibin/

query/r-5139.html>.

[10]Glionna, John. “Bittersweet Memories

Leave Korea’s Defectors Conflicted.”

IrishTimes.com.11 July 2009. 19 July 2009.

<http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/wor

ld/2009/0711/1224250464835.html>.

[11]Dickenson, Elizabeth, Annie Lowrey

and Joshua Keating. “Portraits of Instability:

Haunting Images From The World’s Most

Fragile States.” Foreign Policy22 June 2009.

19 July 2009.

<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/20

09/06/22/portraits_of_instability?

page=0,16>.
Tomas van Houtryve captured

images inside North Korea posing as an

entrepreneur who was interested in

opening a chocolate factory. He found an

unhappy populace, few cars on the only

1,000 miles of paved roads, and tight

restrictions on energy use. Goods are

mostly Chinese while the subway cars in

Pyongyang are East German.

[12] Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. 71. in Taylor, PJ. "All Organization Is Bias: The Political Geography of Electoral Reform."The Geographical JournalVol. 151, No. 3 (Nov., 1985), pp. 339-343.

[13]WTO.org.“Lamy Urges Governments To

Rebuild Confidence”. 27 February 2009. 20

July 2009. <

http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e

/sppl115_e.htm>.

[14]Council on Foreign Relations. The Six-

Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear

Program. 1 July 2009. 21 July 2009. <

http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/>.

[15]International Atomic Energy Agency.

Agreed Framework Of October 21 1994

Between The United States of America And

The Democratic People’s Republic Of

Korea. 2 November 1994. 22 July 2009.

<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Docum

ents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc457.pdf>.

[16]Council on Foreign Relations.The Six-Party

Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program. 1July

2009. 21 July 2009. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/>.

[17]Pedrozo, Raul. “An Offer Kim Can’t

Refuse.” Foreign Policy 24.7 (2009): 1-2. 9

July 2009.

<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/24/an_offer_kim_cant_refuse>.